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The Example of America 
The fight against terrorism is not yet over. It predated the Bush presidency, 
and will continue long after. President Obama has openly assumed the burden 
of the fight. He has assured us that swift and decisive action will be taken 
against terrorists, although he also insisted that this action will be in 
accordance with the Constitution. In his inaugural address he declared, “[a]s 
for our common defense, we reject as false the choice between our safety and 
our ideals,”1 and as the first order of business issued Executive Orders 
addressing some of the abuses of his predecessor.2 Our task, as lawyers and as 
citizens, is to identify these abuses with some specificity and then to describe 
the action that is needed to put the Constitution right. 
In this lecture, I focus on one of the most egregious of all abuses—the 
policies and practices of the Bush years that put into doubt the American 
commitment to prohibiting torture. This prohibition is embodied in a number 
of international instruments, most notably the 1984 Convention Against 
Torture3 and the criminal statute that we enacted to implement that treaty.4 Yet 
it is important to understand, so that we can be clear about the magnitude of 
the wrong, that the rule against torture did not await the arrival of the 1984 
 
1.  President Barack Obama, Inaugural Address (Jan. 20, 2009). 
2.  See Exec. Order No. 13,491, 74 Fed. Reg. 16 (Jan. 27, 2009); Exec. Order No. 13,492, 74 Fed. 
Reg. 16 (Jan. 27, 2009); Exec. Order No. 13,493, 74 Fed. Reg. 16 (Jan. 27, 2009). 
3.  Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 100-20 (1988), 1465 U.N.T.S. 85. 
4.  Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-277, § 2242, 112 Stat. 
2681-822 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1231 note (2006)). 
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Convention and its implementing statute; it is rooted in the Constitution 
itself.5 
The Eighth Amendment prohibits cruel and unusual punishments, and 
torture would surely meet the standard of cruel and unusual.6 Although some 
may claim that torture inflicted for the purpose of extracting information from 
a person held in custody might not be deemed a “punishment” and thus is 
beyond the scope of the Eight Amendment, I insist that such conduct is 
prohibited by an implicit premise of the Eighth Amendment. Certainly, if we 
cannot torture someone who has been judged to have broken the law, we 
cannot torture someone who we only suspect has broken the law or who we 
believe is in possession of information that might enable us to prevent or 
punish unlawful acts. Immanent in the Eighth Amendment is a principle—let 
us call it the dignity principle—that denies state officers the power to treat 
inhumanely anyone in their custody. 
A similar regard for human dignity can be found in the Fifth Amendment. 
In the broadest of terms, that amendment denies the state the authority to 
deprive any person of “life, liberty, or property without due process of law.”7 
This norm has been construed to prohibit not just unfair procedures, but any 
state action that “shocks the conscience” or offends an elemental regard for the 
humanity of persons in state custody. The phrase “shocks the conscience” was 
used by the Supreme Court to denounce police action that consisted of 
pumping the stomach of a suspect.8 The substantive dimensions of due process 
have also been manifest in decisions striking down laws that denied parents the 
right to send their children to private schools9 and more recently, the decision 
that denied consenting adults the right to engage in intimate sexual conduct.10 
As an expression of the dignity principle, the constitutional ban on torture 
of the Fifth and Eighth Amendments is an absolute. It focuses on the intrinsic 
quality of the state practice—its sheer inhumanity—and does not vary 
according to the putative value of the information sought. The constitutional 
ban on torture cannot be overridden or relaxed because the interrogator 
believes he might be able to extract information that will save an innocent life, 
or for that matter, countless lives. The harm to our cherished values would be 
 
5.  For a general overview of the Constitution’s prohibitions against torture, see Seth F. 
Kreimer, Too Close to the Rack and the Screw: Constitutional Constraints on Torture in the War 
on Terror, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 278 (2003). 
6.  U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
7.  U.S. CONST. amend V. 
8.  Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952). 
9.  Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). 
10.  Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
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far greater than the benefit that might possibly be obtained. At issue is nothing 
less than the ideals that define us as a nation. 
President Bush declared that he was opposed to torture, yet he governed in 
a way that put his underlying commitment in doubt. He declared his 
opposition to torture in 2004,11 almost three years after he announced the War 
on Terror, and did so in a most defensive manner—in response to a public 
outcry, initially provoked by the publication of the Abu Ghraib photographs 
and then compounded by the leak of internal memoranda of the Department of 
Justice and the Department of Defense that took the proverbial gloves off 
government interrogators.12 
The first of these memoranda was prepared by John Yoo and signed by Jay 
Bybee, then Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Office of Legal 
Counsel, and was sent to the White House in August 2002.13 The infliction of 
physical pain, Yoo and Bybee said, amounted to torture only when it was 
“equivalent in intensity to the pain accompanying serious physical injury, such 
as organ failure, impairment of a bodily function, or even death.”14 This 
requirement was derived not from an understanding of judicial doctrine 
regarding the range of permissible interrogation techniques, but rather from an 
extraneous source—social insurance regulations defining the conditions for 
paying medical benefits.15 
The Department of Defense memorandum, prepared by William Haynes, 
then General Counsel of the Department, and dated November 27, 2002, 
sought to establish guidelines for interrogating prisoners being held at 
Guantánamo Bay.16 It divided a broad range of interrogation techniques into 
 
11.  See Statement on United Nations International Day in Support of Victims of Torture, 1 PUB. 
PAPERS 1141 (June 26, 2004). 
12.  For an overview of the various officials who referenced this phrase, see Mark Danner, US 
Torture: Voices from the Black Sites, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Apr. 9, 2009. Danner cites the 
widespread use of this language and specifically quotes Cofer Black, former head of the 
CIA’s Counterterrorism Center. See Joint Investigation into September 11th: Hearing Before the 
J.H.-S. Intelligence Comm., 109th Cong. (2002) (statement of Cofer Black, former Dir., CIA 
Counterterrorism Ctr.). 
13.  Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Alberto 
Gonzales, Counsel to the President, Executive Office of the President (Aug. 1, 2002) 
[hereinafter Yoo-Bybee Memorandum], available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
srv/nation/documents/dojinterrogationmemo20020801.pdf. 
14.  Id. 
15.  Id. 
16.  Memorandum from William Haynes, Gen. Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of Def., to Donald 
Rumsfeld, Sec’y of Def. (Nov. 27, 2002) [hereinafter Haynes-Rumsfeld Memorandum], 
available at http://fl1.findlaw.com/news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/dod/ 
gcrums1127120202mem.pdf. 
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three categories. The practices in the first two categories, which included 
round-the-clock interrogations lasting up to twenty hours and the use of stress 
positions such as standing for up to four hours, were deemed lawful and 
available to the Guantánamo interrogators. The third category included 
practices often understood to be torture,17 including waterboarding, a 
technique that used a wet towel and dripping water to induce the perception of 
suffocation or drowning. Haynes said that the practices in this third category 
were forbidden “as a matter of policy . . . at this time,” though he was quick to 
add that they “may be legally available.”18 Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld 
approved Haynes’s recommendations with a handwritten note on the memo 
indicating, “I stand for 8-10 hours a day. Why is standing limited to 4 
hours?”19 
The announcement of the guidelines proposed by Haynes and approved by 
Rumsfeld provoked controversy within the military. As a result, a high level 
working group was assembled in the Department of Defense, and on April 16, 
2003, Secretary Rumsfeld issued a new directive identifying the interrogation 
techniques that would be allowed at Guantánamo. Seventeen of those 
techniques were allowed by the Army Field Manual then in force. Seven 
techniques went beyond the Manual and in so doing once again put the rule 
against torture in doubt.20 To further confuse the matter, the directive 
acknowledged at various points that some had contended that the techniques 
authorized were inconsistent with protections afforded to POWs under the 
Third Geneva Convention.21 The Secretary instructed the interrogators to take 
into consideration such contentions, while at the same time insisting that the 
Guantánamo detainees were not POWs, but rather unlawful enemy 
combatants whose treatment was governed not by the Third Geneva 
 
17.  See, e.g., Confirmation Hearing of Eric Holder Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 
(2009) (including the statements of Eric Holder and multiple members of the Senate 
declaring that waterboarding and other “shameful” techniques are torture). 
18.  Haynes-Rumsfeld Memorandum, supra note 16. 
19.  Id. 
20.  Memorandum from Donald Rumsfeld, Sec’y of Def., to Gen. James T. Hill, Commander, 
U.S.S. Command (Apr. 16, 2003), available at 
http://www.torturingdemocracy.org/documents/20030416.pdf (noting in Tab A that 
techniques “A-Q,” authorized in the memo, are authorized by the Army Field Manual 34-52, 
but that “[f]urther implementation guidance with respect to techniques R-X will need to be 
developed by the appropriate authority”). 
21.  Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 12, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 
U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135. 
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Convention but only by the lesser requirement of humane treatment imposed 
by the Fourth Geneva Convention.22 
Torture is not self-defining, and for that reason, disagreement will 
inevitably arise as to whether a particular interrogation technique constitutes 
torture. The abuse of the Constitution implicit in the Defense and Justice 
memoranda that I just described arose not from the very understandable need 
to provide guidelines for interrogators, but from the content of those 
guidelines and a desire to allow aggressive, indeed coercive, treatment of 
prisoners, without any regard for their dignity. Although our knowledge of the 
actual practices employed by government interrogators during the Bush years 
remains fragmentary, in no small part due to the Administration’s own 
actions,23 the available evidence indicates that they fully understood the 
message being conveyed as no holds barred.24 
In the case of the CIA—which is not covered by the Army Field Manual or 
even Rumsfeld’s guidelines for Guantánamo but only by the Yoo-Bybee 
memorandum—the offense to the Constitution was especially blatant. 
According to a December 2007 television interview with an agent who had 
been on the scene, the CIA used waterboarding—a technique often condemned 
as torture25—against a high-level al Qaeda operative, and did so under 
circumstances that made it clear that this was not the unruly action of agents 
under stress.26 The CIA interrogators in the field were in constant and 
immediate communication with the Deputy Director for Operations in 
Washington, and it was the Deputy Director who determined whether so-
called “enhanced techniques” were to be used, against whom, and with what 
degree of intensity.27 No wonder Michael Mukasey refused, in his confirmation 
hearings to be Attorney General, which occurred shortly before this public 
disclosure, to say whether waterboarding was torture.28 Had he done so, he 
might have politically committed himself to prosecuting some CIA agents and 
their supervisors. 
 
22.  Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287. 
23.  According to a government letter, the CIA destroyed ninety-two interrogation tapes. See 
Letter from Lev L. Dassin, Acting U.S. Att’y, S.D.N.Y., to Alvin K. Hellerstein, Judge, 
S.D.N.Y. (Mar. 2, 2009), available at 
http://www.aclu.org/pdfs/safefree/lettertohellerstein_ciainterrogationtapes.pdf. 
24.  See Danner, supra note 12. 
25.  See, e.g., Confirmation Hearing of Eric Holder, supra note 17. 
26.  Nightline: Inside the CIA; Inside the Secret Prisons (ABC television broadcast Dec. 10, 2007). 
27.  Id. 
28.  Confirmation Hearing of Michael Mukasey Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 
(2007). 
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Not only did the Administration seek to narrow the scope of the rule 
against torture by manipulating the definition of the practices covered, it also 
denied that the President is bound, as a matter of law, by the prohibition 
against torture, and in doing so harked back to a conception of presidential 
power long identified with the Nixon White House. In the late 1970s, 
President Richard Nixon, in an effort to defend the action that led to his 
impeachment and eventual resignation, publicly maintained that the President 
is entitled to disobey the law whenever he determines it is for the good of the 
nation. If the President does an act, he said, it is not illegal. History judged this 
view harshly, but it was taken as an article of faith in certain circles, which 
included Vice President Dick Cheney, and it became an organizing theme of 
the Bush presidency, most remarkably, even in the debates over torture.29 
This conception of almost unlimited presidential power was defended by 
the Department of Justice and its Office of Legal Counsel. The 2002 Yoo-Bybee 
memorandum not only offered a contrived definition of torture, but also put 
into question whether the President, acting as Commander-in-Chief, was 
bound by the prohibition against torture.30 In making this claim, Yoo and 
Bybee treated the rule against torture as nothing more than a congressional 
command. 
Such a characterization of the ban on torture is a grave mistake, for it gives 
no effect to the Fifth and Eighth Amendments; yet this view of presidential 
power is wanting on its own terms. Although the President, as Commander-
in-Chief, might be deemed to have whatever authority is needed to prosecute a 
war successfully, account must also be taken of the constitutional grant of 
authority to Congress over military matters. Article I grants Congress the 
power to define and punish “[o]ffenses against the Law of Nations,” “[t]o 
make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water,” and “[t]o make Rules 
for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces.”31 The 
making of such rules would surely include the power to determine how 
individuals who are detained in a military situation should be treated or 
interrogated. The constitutional vision is one of shared powers. Of course, 
conflicts between those who share power may sometimes arise. The error of 
Yoo and Bybee, however, was to assume that in the case of such conflicts, the 
 
29.  See, e.g., Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to 
William Haynes, Gen. Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of Def. 1 (Mar. 13, 2002), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/documents/memorandumpresidentpower03132002.pdf 
(providing the Office of the Attorney General’s opinion on “[t]he President’s power as 
Commander in Chief to transfer captured terrorists to the control and custody of foreign 
nations”). 
30.  Yoo-Bybee Memorandum, supra note 13. 
31.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
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President as Commander-in-Chief should prevail over Congress. They gave no 
reason for that view, nor is one readily apparent. 
The inadequacy of Yoo and Bybee’s view of presidential power is even 
more apparent once we acknowledge the Fifth and Eighth Amendments’ roots 
of the prohibition against torture, for all exercises of the powers of the 
President, like those of any branch of government, must comply with the Bill 
of Rights. This basic proposition of constitutional law is implicit in the very 
institution of judicial review, which empowers the judiciary to set aside 
measures of the President or Congress that might be within their enumerated 
powers but inconsistent with the Bill of Rights. 
The understanding of presidential power propounded by Yoo and Bybee 
even survived the repudiation of their contrived definition of torture. In 
December 2004, in the wake of the public outcry surrounding the leak of the 
Yoo-Bybee memorandum, the Department of Justice issued another 
memorandum on torture.32 This new memorandum explicitly repudiated Yoo 
and Bybee’s definition of torture, stating that all that is required to constitute 
torture is severe or extreme pain; however, it did not withdraw or in any way 
modify the Yoo-Bybee view of presidential power. The new memorandum said 
it was unnecessary to address the issue of presidential power because the 
President had publicly declared, as a matter of policy, his opposition to torture. 
In fact, the President’s actions regarding the Detainee Treatment Act of 
2005 put his policy very much into question.33 He fiercely resisted the 
enactment of the provision, spearheaded by John McCain, which codified the 
constitutional ban on torture.34 Upon signing the Act into law, the President 
explained that he was signing the measure with the understanding that the 
statute did not create or confer a private right of action on victims of torture.35 
He also said that he intended to construe the statute in a way that was 
consistent with his constitutional powers as Commander-in-Chief and his duty 
to protect against future terrorist attacks.36 The legal effect of this so-called 
 
32.  Memorandum from Daniel Levin, Acting Assistant Att’y Gen., to James B. Comey, Deputy 
Att’y Gen. (Dec. 30, 2004), available at 
http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/us_law/etn/pdf/levin-memo-123004.pdf. 
33.  Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, 42 U.S.C. § 2000dd (Supp. V 2005). 
34.  See President George W. Bush, Press Conference at the White House (Sept. 15, 2006), 
available at 
http://www.boston.com/news/nation/washington/articles/2006/09/15/bushs_speech_on_te
rror_legislation (objecting to the “vague standards” of the Geneva Convention as a basis for 
codified interrogation rules). 
35.  President George W. Bush, President’s Statement on Signing of H.R. 2863 (Dec. 30, 2005), 
available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=65259. 
36.  Id. 
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signing statement was unclear, but not its political implications. It was widely 
understood to indicate that President Bush did not believe himself bound by 
the Act and that, if military necessity dictated, he would allow prisoners to be 
tortured as part of an interrogation process.37 
In keeping with its expansive view of executive power, the Administration 
further diminished the Constitution by engaging in a practice—known as 
extraordinary rendition—that involved torture, though by foreign nations. 
Extraordinary rendition is distinguishable from the more common form of 
rendition, in which the Executive, acting outside of a formal judicial 
proceeding, delivers an individual to another nation to stand trial. In 
extraordinary rendition, the Executive, also acting outside a judicial process, 
sends an individual to a foreign nation not for purposes of putting that person 
on trial, but rather for interrogating that person and extracting information of 
use to the United States. The predicate of such a transfer is that the nation 
receiving the prisoner will use aggressive and brutal interrogation techniques—
torture—that United States agents are not prepared to use. Although this 
practice antedates the Bush Administration and the global War on Terror, it 
was used with notable frequency in the Bush years—there are some indications 
that it has been used between one hundred and one thousand times during this 
period.38 
The element of “outsourcing,” to use Jane Mayer’s term,39 that is entailed 
in extraordinary rendition is of no legal or moral significance. If the 
Constitution prohibits United States officials from engaging in a certain 
practice, then it also prohibits those officials from creating an arrangement 
whereby officials of another nation do the prohibited action. Imagine prison 
officials who do not actually torture prisoners in their custody, but turn the 
prisoners over to other inmates to do what is denied them. These prison 
officials can be faulted not just for the transfer, but also for the torture that 
occurred through the arrangement they created. The dignity principle 
immanent in the Fifth and Eighth Amendments binds the United States and all 
those who act on its request and in its interest. 
 
37.  See, e.g., Charlie Savage, Bush Could Bypass New Torture Ban: Waiver Right Is Reserved, 
BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 4, 2006. 
38.  JANE MAYER, THE DARK SIDE 108 (2008); see also Eur. Parl. Ass., Alleged Secret Detentions and 
Unlawful Inter-state Transfers of Detainees Involving Council of Europe Member States, Res. No. 
1507 (2006), available at 
http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=/documents/AdoptedText/ta06/ERES1507.htm 
(estimating that “hundreds of persons” had been “entrapped” in a U.S. system of secret 
detentions and extraordinary rendition). 
39.  MAYER, supra note 39, at 121. 
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A more difficult legal question presented by extraordinary rendition—and 
one that might be lurking beneath all the torture debates of the Bush era—
concerns the territorial reach of the constitutional ban against torture. 
Americans are fully protected by the Constitution no matter where they reside. 
Yet they have not been the target of extraordinary rendition, nor have aliens 
who are residents of the United States. With one possible exception, 
extraordinary rendition has only been used against foreign nationals living 
abroad—for example, a German citizen traveling in Macedonia was seized by 
CIA officials and taken to Afghanistan, and an Egyptian citizen was kidnapped 
by CIA agents on the streets of Milan and taken to Egypt. 
The one possible exception to this rule concerns the extraordinary rendition 
of Maher Arar, who was seized by immigration officials on September 26, 
2002, at JFK airport, held virtually incommunicado for thirteen days in nearby 
detention facilities, and then sent to Syria via Jordan for the specific purpose of 
interrogation under conditions of torture. Arar brought a suit in federal court 
to test the legality of his rendition, which, due to the involvement of 
immigration officials, was implemented under the auspices of the Department 
of Justice rather than the CIA. Arar’s suit was dismissed by the district court. A 
panel of the Second Circuit affirmed that decision, and the matter is now 
pending before the Second Circuit sitting en banc.40 The case was argued on 
December 9, 2008, in the closing days of the Bush Administration, and is of 
special significance for me and the nation. 
Arar had only the most fleeting connections to the United States. He was 
born in Syria and by virtue of that birth is a citizen of Syria. He moved to 
Canada with his family as a teenager and resided there ever since. At the time 
of his arrest in 2002 he was thirty-three years old and had become a naturalized 
citizen of Canada.41 
Arar had been vacationing with his family in Tunisia and was arrested 
when he was returning to Canada for business. His itinerary took him from 
Tunisia to Switzerland and then on to JFK, where he was to take a flight to 
Montreal. Transit passengers at JFK need to clear customs and while in line 
waiting to present his passport to an immigration official, Arar was arrested.42 
The arrest was based on a tip (which was later proved to be false) from the 
Royal Mounted Police of Canada that identified Arar as a member of a terrorist 
organization.43 
 
40.  Arar v. Ashcroft, 532 F.3d 157, 164 (2d Cir. 2008), reh’g en banc granted, Arar v. Ashcroft, No. 
06-4216 (2d Cir. Aug. 12, 2008), available at 
http://www.ccrjustice.org/files/8.12.08_Order_for_Rehearing_EnBanc.pdf. 
41.  Id. at 194. 
42.  Id. at 195. 
43.  Id. at 162, 203. 
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After his brief detention in the United States, Arar was flown to Syria, 
where he was imprisoned for ten months in a grave-like cell measuring six feet 
long, seven feet tall, and three feet wide. He alleged that during the first twelve 
days he was interrogated for some eighteen hours a day and severely beaten.44 
The interrogation ceased when Canadian officials interceded on his behalf, but 
Arar remained incarcerated for nine more months, at which time Canadian 
officials were able to secure his release.45 
From my perspective, Arar’s imprisonment and interrogation violated the 
United States Constitution. This conclusion is not derived from the fact that 
he, unlike the German or Egyptian citizens, was arrested on United States soil, 
specifically JFK Airport, and imprisoned in the United States for a number of 
days before being sent to Syria. His entitlement to the protection of the 
Constitution derives not from his brief and guarded presence on United States 
soil, but from the notion that the Fifth and Eighth Amendments and their ban 
on torture are applicable to the officers of the United States and their agents 
wherever they act and against whomever they act. 
The Fifth Amendment purports to protect any “person.”46 The Eighth 
Amendment is cast as a flat prohibition with no effort to delineate the group of 
persons protected and should be understood as defining the authority of 
American officials.47 More fundamentally, this reading of the Fifth and Eighth 
Amendments derives from the underlying value at issue—a just and proper 
regard for the dignity of each person held in state custody. Human dignity is 
violated whenever someone is tortured, regardless of where the torture takes 
place. A violation of the United States Constitution and the basic charter of this 
nation occurs when the persons responsible for the torture are United States 
officials. 
This broad understanding of the Constitution is reflected in the provisions 
of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005,48 which prohibits torture by United 
States officials wherever they act and against whomever they act. So does the 
federal statute criminalizing torture; it specifically prohibits torture by United 
States officials acting outside of the country.49 Of like import is the recent 
decision of the Supreme Court invalidating the statute denying habeas corpus 
 
44.  Id. at 166, 197. 
45.  Id. at 197-98. 
46.  U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
47.  U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
48.  Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, 42 U.S.C. § 2000dd (Supp. V 2005). 
49.  Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-277, § 2242, 112 Stat. 
2681-822 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1231 note (2006)). 
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to the Guantánamo prisoners (all foreign nationals).50 Admittedly, the Court in 
that case did not determine what substantive rights the Guantánamo prisoners 
had, but the very act of extending the constitutional protection of habeas 
corpus to these prisoners necessarily implies that they had some constitutional 
rights—the most basic—for otherwise the writ would be of no utility. 
This interpretation of the recent Supreme Court decision accords with a 
constitutional tradition reaching all the way back to the Insular Cases of the 
early 1900s. One of these cases posed the question whether the Sixth 
Amendment guarantee to trial by jury was applicable in the Philippines, which 
was then being held as a colony.51 The Supreme Court concluded that the Bill 
of Rights was not in its entirety applicable to the administration of an 
unincorporated territory such as the Philippines.52 Yet the Court qualified that 
holding by declaring that United States officials were always bound to respect 
the fundamental rights of all persons living in the territory.53 Among the most 
basic or fundamental of all rights is the right against torture. 
In an unincorporated territory, such as the Philippines, the United States is 
sovereign. Similarly, the United States could be deemed to exercise a de facto 
sovereignty over Guantánamo. No such claim could be made about Syria, 
where Arar had been transferred and interrogated. Yet it is difficult to 
understand why the geographic site of the torture—whether it took place on 
American soil or in Syria—has any significance in determining the applicability 
of the Fifth and Eighth Amendments’ ban on torture. What makes the 
constitutional ban on torture applicable is the fact that the torture is inflicted 
by American officials or others acting on their behalf. The dignity principle 
that drives the interpretation of the Fifth and Eight Amendments is person-, 
not place-, oriented. 
Pressed, I am unable to point to a Supreme Court decision that clearly and 
authoritatively announces such a rule. I must therefore acknowledge that the 
willingness of the Bush Administration to engage in extraordinary renditions 
may reflect not an indifference to the Constitution, but rather a genuine 
dispute over its territorial reach. Such a lawyerly disagreement, if that is all that 
is at stake, would surely have made the need for a judicial determination of the 
lawfulness of the practice all the more appropriate. Yet rather than defending 
on the merits the extraordinary rendition of Arar and others, thereby obtaining 
a judicial resolution of this issue, the Bush Administration invoked a number of 
doctrines—some very technical—that called for the dismissal of the suit 
 
50.  Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008). 
51.  Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138 (1904); accord Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922). 
52.  Dorr, 195 U.S. at 149. 
53.  Id. at 148. 
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without ever reaching the merits of the substantive claim, either as a matter of 
fact or law. 
At this point, the judiciary could have stood up for the Constitution and 
discharged its most elemental responsibility, but it chose another course 
altogether. It sustained the government’s motion to dismiss, and in so doing 
became complicit in the Administration’s assault on the Constitution. Vice 
President Dick Cheney and his assistant, David Addington, may have been at 
the helm of a small cabal directing that assault, as some have contended, but 
they would not have been able to achieve their purposes and diminish the 
Constitution in the ways that they did if other institutions, including the 
judiciary, had not allowed them to have their way for as long as they did. 
The lower federal courts based their reluctance to examine the legality of 
the extraordinary rendition program on a number of grounds. One related to 
the remedy sought. An injunction would not have been appropriate because the 
victim of the rendition, such as Arar, who miraculously secured his freedom 
and brought suit in federal court, could not demonstrate the likelihood of 
recurrence. So Arar asked for a declaratory judgment and damages—a 
declaration that he was wronged, and compensation for that wrong. 
Every lawsuit rests on a legal claim. When an injunction is sought, the 
Constitution itself provides the claim, without the need for any congressional 
authorization. The same rule applies to declaratory judgments. Although a 
congressional statute passed in the 1930s made the declaratory remedy 
available to federal courts,54 the cause of action or claim underlying the request 
for that remedy arises, much like that for an injunction, from the Constitution 
itself and does not need congressional authorization. 
In the 1971 Bivens decision,55 the Supreme Court extended this same 
principle to damage actions, though with one qualification. The Court held 
that a claim or cause of action underlying a request for damages for a 
constitutional wrong arises from the Constitution itself, unless there are some 
“special factors” that might make it appropriate to require congressional 
authorization.56 In the Arar case, a panel of the Second Circuit treated the 
foreign policy and military ramifications of extraordinary rendition as such a 
“special factor” and on that ground disallowed Arar’s claim for damages. The 
court said that it lacked congressional authorization to award damages.57 
Such a ruling seems odd in the extreme. Congress, unlike the judiciary, is a 
political body, but that does not give it any expertise or special competence in 
 
54.  Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (2006). 
55.  Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). 
56.  Id. at 396. 
57.  Arar v. Ashcroft, 532 F.3d 157, 164 (2d Cir. 2008). 
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matters of foreign or military policy. Moreover, unless the “special factors” 
exception to the Bivens rule is going to degenerate into a free floating “political 
question” doctrine, long discredited by the Supreme Court, it is not clear why 
the characterization of Congress as a political institution constitutes a reason 
for the judiciary to await congressional authorization before allowing damages 
for the violation of a constitutional right. Although there is a longstanding 
tradition of the judiciary deferring to the Executive in matters of foreign and 
military policy, that deference does not belong to Congress and does not in any 
way depend on the nature of the remedy sought. In fact, this deference might 
be due to the Executive even if Congress passes a statute authorizing suits for 
damages. 
Wholly apart from the question of whether a statute is needed under the 
terms of Bivens to create a claim for damages, the government sought to defeat 
Arar’s claim for damages by invoking what has become known as the “qualified 
privilege.” According to this privilege, damages will only be awarded if it can 
be shown that the officials being sued violated a right that had been clearly 
articulated at the time they had acted. In the Arar case, the Bush 
Administration did not deny that the right against torture in some general 
sense had the requisite clarity, but only that it was uncertain that the right 
extended to foreign nationals who were tortured on foreign soil by foreign 
officials.58 Accordingly, there would be no point, the government argued, in 
judging the constitutionality of the extraordinary rendition because, even if it 
were unconstitutional, damages could not be recovered by Arar due to the 
qualified privilege.59 
The qualified privilege invoked by the government serves two purposes. It 
avoids the unfairness of holding the government liable for damages for conduct 
that was not understood to be unlawful at the time it was undertaken. It also 
avoids creating disincentives for taking forceful and innovative action in a 
context where the legality of the proposed action was uncertain. I am doubtful 
that either purpose would be furthered by a ruling that put extraordinary 
rendition within the protection of the qualified privilege. Granted, there has 
been no clear ruling on the legality of extraordinary rendition, but given the 
universality and force of the norms and laws against torture, it should be clear 
to government officials acting in good faith that the practice runs afoul of the 
Constitution. This is especially true in light of the fact that the Convention 
Against Torture prohibits the United States from sending any alien back to his 
country of origin if there is any chance that he might be tortured.60 
 
58.  Id. 
59.  Id. 
60.  Convention Against Torture, supra note 3. 
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More importantly, even if the claim for damages must be dismissed 
without reaching the merits, either because of the qualified privilege or because 
of the Bivens exception, the claim for a declaratory judgment remains 
unaffected. The declaratory judgment does not require any congressional 
authorization and does not penalize any past act. It simply declares the law. It 
is an exercise of the core judicial function. It enables the judiciary to remove 
any lingering uncertainty as to the legality of extraordinary rendition, and in 
that way, restore the sovereignty of the Constitution. 
The Second Circuit panel held otherwise and dismissed Arar’s claim for a 
declaratory judgment on the theory that he lacked standing required by Article 
III. There was no doubt that Arar suffered concrete injury. The question was 
whether the declaration—in contrast to damages—would confer a concrete 
benefit. Worried about this issue, Arar’s lawyers artificially defined the 
declaration sought. The complaint did not seek a declaration of the 
unconstitutionality of the rendition to which Arar was subjected, but rather the 
invalidity of the removal order that was issued against him (in order to 
effectuate the rendition). Such a declaration, they reasoned, would confer a 
concrete benefit. The Second Circuit panel denied, however, that a declaration 
of the invalidity of the removal order could in fact be of any benefit to Arar. He 
had been designated as a member of a terrorist organization, and as long as 
that designation stood, the panel held, he could be denied permission to enter 
the country, and if so, a judgment invalidating the removal order would not 
confer a concrete benefit on him.61 
Arar’s lawyers fell into a trap of their own creation. The focus of the 
declaratory judgment should not have been on the removal order, but rather on 
the constitutionality of the practice of extraordinary rendition—the torture of a 
foreign national by a foreign government at the behest of American officials. 
Rule 54(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure gives a court the authority to 
enter any order that is just,62 and Arar’s claim should not be precluded by the 
strategic decision—possibly a blunder—of his lawyers. 
The concrete harm that Arar suffered should be sufficient to give him 
Article III standing to obtain a declaratory judgment on the legality of his 
rendition. We all suffer when someone is tortured, because the basic law of the 
nation is compromised, but the victim of the rendition suffers in a distinct and 
very particularized way. His personal suffering constitutes an injury in fact and 
as such should entitle him to invoke the power of the federal judiciary. As a 
purely formal matter, such a declaratory proceeding would constitute a “case” 
 
61.  Arar, 532 F.3d at 164. 
62.  FED R. CIV. P. 54(c). 
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or “controversy” within the meaning of Article III.63 The policy objectives 
served by the standing requirement are also satisfied. Arar has every incentive 
to make certain that the contentions of law and fact are vigorously presented. 
The claim tendered is the same as would be presented in any injunctive 
proceeding—the government acted in violation of the Constitution—and 
respects the inherently legal function of the judiciary: to say what the law is. 
Concrete benefits should not also be required, but even if they are, they can 
be found in Arar’s case. The declaratory judgment does not contain the 
material component of a damages award, but much like a damages award, it 
speaks both to the world and to the victim. It says to all the world that the 
government violated basic norms of the legal order—the Fifth and Eighth 
Amendments. It also addresses the rendition victim and tells him in a direct 
and personal way that he has been wronged—high American officials violated 
the basic law of their nation in sending him to Syria for interrogation under 
conditions of torture. Such a statement may have as much meaning to the 
victim and give him as much satisfaction as an award of damages. It helps 
restore his self-worth. It speaks to his soul, not his pocketbook, but there is 
nothing in Article III that prioritizes the material over the spiritual. 
Other suits brought by victims of extraordinary rendition have been 
dismissed on the basis of a principle—the state secret doctrine—that honors the 
very understandable need to conduct some of the business of government in 
the dark. The doctrine was first announced in a case involving a tort suit 
against the United States for a death arising from the crash of a military 
airplane.64 As part of the discovery process, the plaintiff sought internal 
government documents relating to the construction of the plane, and the 
Supreme Court upheld the refusal of the government to surrender those 
documents. The plaintiff was allowed to continue his litigation, though 
without the benefit of certain information in the possession of the government. 
As originally crafted, the state secret doctrine operated only as an 
evidentiary privilege, but it has been transformed during the Bush years into a 
de facto grant of immunity. In another lawsuit regarding extraordinary 
rendition, this one brought against a private contractor that the CIA allegedly 
had engaged to transport the prisoner to the site where he was to be 
interrogated under conditions of torture, the state secret doctrine was used not 
to withhold some evidence from the plaintiff but to dismiss the suit in its 
entirety. The district court reasoned that any inquiry into the rendition would 
compromise the secrecy of the CIA.65 In so transforming the state secret 
 
63.  U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
64.  United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953). 
65.  Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 539 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 1134-36 (N.D. Cal. 2008). 
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doctrine from an evidentiary privilege into a de facto grant of immunity, the 
court threatened the rule—long the hallmark of our legal system—that subjects 
all government officials, even the CIA, to the Constitution, and entrusts the 
judiciary with the task of determining whether these officials have followed the 
Constitution. 
This use of the state secret doctrine overlooks the distinctly public purposes 
of the suit before it—in this instance, to determine the legality of extraordinary 
rendition. The request for damages may make the suit similar to the run-of-
the-mill tort suit, such as one seeking the damages for a death resulting from a 
plane crash, inasmuch as it has both a private and public dimension. On the 
other hand, the request for a declaratory judgment—absent in the ordinary tort 
suit—accentuates the essentially public purpose of the suit and thus must be 
weighed against the government’s claim of secrecy. If the damage claim is 
precluded by either the qualified privilege or the exception to the Bivens rule, 
then the court should begin its analysis of the state secret doctrine by 
acknowledging the essentially public character of the suit and the danger of 
dismissal. Honoring the state secret doctrine any time a clandestine agency 
such as the CIA or one of its instrumentalities is charged with violating the 
Constitution would, in effect, place that agency beyond the reach of the 
Constitution. 
Claims of secrecy are commonplace in criminal prosecutions—the 
paradigmatic public lawsuit. In that context, the government is given two 
options: (a) make the evidence (or its equivalent) available to the defendant or 
(b) drop the prosecution altogether. In the civil context, especially when a 
request for a declaratory judgment is at issue and the public nature of the 
lawsuit is clear, a similar procedure can be followed. The judge should 
determine, in camera if necessary, the legitimacy of the need for secrecy. If it is 
determined that the need for secrecy is legitimate, the judge must then 
determine how central the information or evidence is to the plaintiff’s case. If it 
is not central, and the claim for secrecy is well-grounded, then the information 
can be withheld and the plaintiff will be allowed to move forward with the trial 
if he so chooses. If the information is determined to be central, then the judge 
should provide the government with an option: (a) disclosure or (b) allowing 
the entry of a default judgment against it, provided the plaintiff establishes a 
prima facie case. As in a criminal case, the judge will respect the government’s 
insistence on secrecy, but at the same time require it to bear the consequences 
of its action and thus prevent the state secret doctrine from becoming a de facto 
grant of immunity. 
Finally, apart from the state secret doctrine, and regardless of what remedy 
is sought, account must be taken of the reluctance of the judiciary to second 
guess the Executive on foreign and military issues. Courts labor under a 
constitutional tradition that calls for judicial deference in such matters and for 
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that reason will be hesitant to inquire into the merits of the rendition victim’s 
claim. 
Admittedly, the Executive possesses a special competence in defining the 
foreign policy objectives of the nation and how those objectives might be 
pursued. The Executive also has special competence in determining how a war 
should be fought—what military action is required for a victory. Yet the 
Executive has no special competence when it comes to determining whether 
the challenged action, even if it is of a military nature or implicates foreign 
policy, comports with the fundamental values of the nation.66 Indeed, such a 
determination is the essence of the judicial function—to determine whether 
extraordinary rendition, even if fully required by foreign policy or military 
objectives, is consistent with the dictates of the Fifth and Eighth Amendments. 
On that issue, the Executive is likely to have a view, as the Bush Administration 
most certainly did, but it is owed no deference. The authority of the judiciary 
over such questions of value arises not from the personal virtues of those who 
happen to sit on the bench, but rather from the strictures of public reason that 
govern all exercises of the judicial power—the need to listen to all those 
aggrieved, to try questions of the law and facts in a open courtroom, and to 
justify its decision on the basis of principle. 
On January 20, 2009, the Bush presidency was brought to a close, and we 
seemed to have entered a new era. President Obama immediately issued 
Executive Orders addressed to some of the abuses of the previous 
Administration. He confined the CIA, at least until further study, to 
interrogation techniques set forth in the Army Field Manual;67 closed the secret 
prisons, the so-called “black sites” maintained by the CIA;68 and required the 
closing of Guantánamo in a year’s time.69 All of this action should be 
applauded because it has the inevitable effect of minimizing the risk of torture. 
“Black Sites” and “Guantánamo” entered the legal lexicon as prisons in which 
foreign nationals were abused and maybe even tortured. Moreover, having the 
CIA governed by the Army Field Manual will, at least nominally, place the 
“enhanced interrogation” techniques they had used off limits. 
Following this initial flurry, the signals sent by the new Administration 
have been decidedly more mixed. To his credit, President Obama declared at 
his first press conference, as he did throughout his campaign, that he is 
 
66.  See AHARON BARAK, THE JUDGE IN A DEMOCRACY 246-47 (2006). 
67.  See Exec. Order No. 13,491, supra note 2. 
68.  See Exec. Order No. 13,492, supra note 2. 
69.  See Exec. Order No. 13,493, supra note 2. 
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opposed to torture.70 In his first address to a joint session of Congress he spoke 
inspirationally of the example of America and once again declared his 
opposition to torture.71 His nominee for Attorney General, Eric Holder, in a 
clear attempt to distance himself from Bush’s last Attorney General, Michael 
Mukasey, declared in his confirmation hearing, without the least hesitation, 
that waterboarding is torture.72 
On the other hand, no order was issued by President Obama barring the 
practice of extraordinary rendition, and at his confirmation hearing, Leon 
Panetta, Obama’s choice to head the CIA, equivocated on whether 
extraordinary rendition would be used by his agency in the future.73 He was 
unprepared to send someone to another country “for the purpose of torture or 
actions by another country that violate our human values,” but he also said that 
he might be prepared to return the person seized “to another country where 
they prosecute them under their laws.”74 He failed to guarantee that the person 
subject to the rendition would have judicial procedures available to make 
certain that he would not be tortured, and this failure may have rendered the 
distinction he drew illusory in practice. 
Only time will tell whether these concerns about the future practices of the 
new Administration are justified. Even deeper misgivings relate to the past and 
to the reluctance of the new Administration to take appropriate corrective 
action for the constitutional wrongs that occurred over the last seven years. At 
his first press conference, the President, when asked to comment on Senator 
Patrick Leahy’s proposal for the establishment of a truth commission, said that 
he was more concerned with the future than the past.75 Fully in accord with 
this sentiment, Leon Panetta announced at his confirmation hearing that CIA 
agents that engaged in torture, including waterboarding, in the early phases of 
the war against terrorism, would not be criminally prosecuted.76 Nor has there 
been any indication that the new Administration would disavow the many 
strategies used by the Bush Administration to avoid a ruling on the merits on 
any of the suits brought by victims of extraordinary rendition. To the contrary, 
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in an argument before the Ninth Circuit last month in the suit against a CIA 
contractor, lawyers for the government once again relied on the state secret 
doctrine and thus seem prepared to confer de facto immunity on the CIA for 
constitutional wrongs as gross as those entailed in extraordinary rendition.77 
A willingness to speak only to the future is not sufficient. Not only must 
the new Administration establish policies that preclude torture in the future, it 
must also account for the wrongs of the past. It must prosecute those who 
engaged in practices clearly understood to be torture and provide civil remedies 
to those who were in fact tortured. In the civil context, the government is 
entitled to defend on the merits suits by victims of torture such as Arar, but 
should not hide behind the technical doctrines that have enabled the judiciary 
to avoid adjudicating the claims before it. The judiciary may have its own 
reasons for avoiding judgment on the merits, but it is doubtful that they would 
be sufficient in the face of the announced policy of the Administration. 
Such a stance would provide a measure of justice to the victims of torture, 
and not so incidentally, lend credence to the lofty rhetoric of President Obama 
about the future. It would bring to light the way the Constitution had been 
abused and enable the public to confront and acknowledge the violations of the 
Constitution committed in their name. The public would have an opportunity 
to say “Nunca Más.” These proceedings would also allow the judiciary to 
affirm the dignity principle and the constitutional norms to which it gives life, 
and to declare—in bold and clear terms—that these norms apply to American 
officials and their instrumentalities wherever they act and against whomever 
they act.  
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